See, e.g., Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT 'L L. 75 (1996) ; Sean Selin, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an International Solution, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 365 (1997) ; Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing on the Global Information Infrastructure: Disharmony in Cyberspace, 16 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 224, 246-47 (1995) . David Post offers the Clinton Administration's NII White Paper and the WIPO Copyright Treaties as examples of this internationalization tendency. See David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 164 n.24 (1996) . While international law is not really private ordering because it involves the interaction of governments, the way in which governments interact in international law (at least in peacetime) is generally through agreement and not coercive authority. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1022 REV. 993, -25 (1994 (treating customary international law as a form of quasi-private ordering). Cf. Robyn Forman Pollack, Creating the Standards of a Global Community: Regulating Pornography on the Internet --An International Concern, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467 (1996) (suggesting international self-regulation).
Dan Burk makes the suggestion that international treaties harmonizing trademark law will help alleviate some of the problems associated with the Net's globalization of trademark disputes. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 731-33 (1998) . This is not really an argument for internationalization as a replacement for sovereign law, since the treaty in question would simply facilitate the enforcement of national laws. Cf. Dan L. Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION incomplete, because I do not even attempt to catalog the shortcomings of public law, or weigh the two in context to determine which approach is more efficient. Still, I think there are some fundamental problems that have gone unaddressed in the headlong academic rush to reconceive Internet governance. By emphasizing those problems, I hope to advance the discussion of how these institutions should be compared.
I. Arguments for Norms in Internet Law
The recent explorations by law and economics scholars of norms of social behavior are well catalogued. Robert Ellickson investigated a number of social groups that resolve disputes outside (and sometimes in opposition to) the legal system, including cattle ranchers in rural California and professors at academic research institutions. 15 
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Bernstein has contributed analyses of the business practices of grain merchants 16 and U. PA. L. REV. 2181 REV. (1996 Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996) . 13 Stephen Carter makes a similar distinction in his review of Richard Epstein's work on norms in intellectual property law. See Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Adjudication, and Petrushevsky's Watch: Some Notes From the Intellectual Property Front, 78 VA. L. REV. 129, 130-31 (1992) . 14 See generally Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (1990) (discussing the role of new institutional economics in evaluating governance structures). 15 See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at . 16 See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 12, at __.
This empirical work on norms is at base descriptive. Ellickson, Bernstein and others endeavour to tell us how people behave when confronted with a set of legal rules and practical problems. Similar descriptive work exists on norms and the Net, though most of it is casual and not terribly rigorous. For example, various writers have talked about the social norms that characterize behavior of people online in different venues: the use of "emoticons" to convey a rough facsimile of what a face might; informal "rules" that govern both the ".sig" files that identify speakers and the editing of other people's words in a discussion group; the use of "flaming" as a method of social sanction against those who violate the norms of the Net; and even the diversity of social groups on the Net itself. 22 See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 641-45 (1998) (evaluating the netiquette of linking and framing on the Internet); cf. Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311, 313 (1995) (identifying some of these Net norms and their informal enforcement mechanisms).
particularly in developing countries that lack an established legal system. 25 By contrast, others suggest that norms may be inefficient in certain circumstances, and that the law can appropriately try to modify or restrict private behavior in these circumstances.
26
Some proponents have gone further, suggesting prescriptive uses for these observations of norms in the law. 27 This group of proponents argues that the law should 23 See Elkin-Koren, supra note __, at __; Fisher, supra note __, at __; Johnson & Post, Chaos, supra note __, at __. Hank Perritt's paper takes a different tack --he focuses on the Net not as a source of norms governing human behavior online, but as a facilitative mechanism for private ordering. Because the Net reduces transactions costs, it may make possible social groupings and agreements that otherwise would never have occurred. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet Is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. __ (1999) . See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 155 (1997) . I have no quarrel with this view of private ordering either. It seems likely that the Net will reduce transactions costs, as Merges and others have predicted, see Merges, supra note 9, at , though perhaps not as much as everyone seems to expect. See id., at (noting that a number of transactions costs will still remain on the Net); A. Michael Froomkin & J. Bradford deLong, The Next Economy, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Deborah Hurley, Brian Kahin, and Hal Varian, eds., 1998) . 24 When H.L. Mencken was asked whether he believed in infant baptism, he is reputed to have replied "Believe in it?! Why, I've seen it done!" Similarly, it is perhaps a little odd to speak of proponents and opponents of norms. Norms exist, and it is hard to imagine a world in which they did not. Nonetheless, legal scholars differ significantly on the question of whether extralegal norms themselves are good or bad, and on the question of whether and how the law should take account of them. I speak of those who are enamoured with informal norms as an alternative to law as "proponents" of norms. 25 Cooter, Market Modernization, supra note 12, at __; Cooter, Legal Centrism, supra note 12, at __. On the Internet front, see Johnson & Post, Chaos, supra note 4, at __. 26 See Lessig, supra note 12, at __; Posner, supra note 12, at 1728-36; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) . 27 For reasons I hope are obvious, I will avoid calling these approaches "normative." three distinct types of prescriptive arguments, listed here in roughly increasing order of strength.
The first prescriptive argument is that the law should defer to norms in isolated cases. For example, one might construct a contract law whose rules regarding a transaction are informed by the "customs" or "course of dealing" in an industry, at least where the terms of the contract are ambiguous. 30 The Uniform Commercial Code takes this approach to some extent.
31
To some extent, this first approach turns courts into anthropologists --the application of legal rules will depend on the court's ability to identify the custom in an industry accurately. And it raises the possibility that an industry can 28 Not all the "proponents" of norms argue that the law should enforce or take account of them. A significant body of norm scholarship argues that norms are best dealt with by refusing to enforce them in a court. REV. 1913 REV. , 1917 REV. (1996 . In effect, these scholars endorse norms as self-interested gifts rather than obligations: a party is under no legal obligation to comply with a norm, though it will sometimes be in its self-interest to do so. 29 For a useful discussion of the role of custom in the law, with particular reference to intellectual property law, 85, 124-28 (1992) . 31 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1 -205, 2-202, 2-208 (1998) ; see also Charny, supra note 27, at 379 (arguing for judicial deference to the will of the parties). For a discussion of the influence of merchant norms on acquires the force of law, or where the law cedes control entirely to a group that has no official government.
II. Problems With Enforcing Internet Norms
In this section, I suggest a number of problems with judicial deference to Internet norms in any of these forms, but particularly deference that would allow those norms to displace the law in whole or in part. Some of these problems are general; 53 others are specific to the Internet. While they do not demonstrate that the law should never defer to extralegal ordering or take norms into account, taken together these problems should offer a strong cautionary note to those who would replace public rules with either publiclyenforced private ones or with self-enforcing norms.
A. Norms Change Over Time
It is no accident that virtually all of the empirical work on norms has taken place in Second, it may simply be impossible to govern a community above a certain size without formal rules and processes. 60 The communities that law and economics scholars have studied have usually been small as well as closely tied together. As the size of a group increases, it becomes less likely that all its members share a commonality of interest.
Members may begin to feel anonymous, and therefore to feel less social constraint on their actions. Someone may be ashamed to transgress a moral boundary in front of people they know, but willing to do it in front of strangers. Perhaps, one might attempt to recreate informal norms by dividing the Net into small groups, 61 though it is not at all clear that creating such groups will restore a sense of community, 62 particularly when exit from the 58 See Merges, supra note 9, at 128-29 (noting the early Net norms that promoted free exchange); Ira V. Heffan, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487 REV. (1997 . Examples of Internet norms that were once well-established but now seem quaint or irrelevant include:
• the idea that copyright has no role to play on the Internet, see John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84.
• the idea that the use of the Internet by commercial entities (the old form) or for commercial purposes (the slightly newer form) is unacceptable, see CLIFFORD STOLL, SILICON SNAKE-OIL: SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY 17-19, 101-05 (1995) (noting this stricture).
• the idea that bandwidth is scarce, and that even text-based communication must be narrowly circumscribed (for example, by limiting the size of your .sig file). All of these ideas carry some currency in certain circles on the Net even today. 59 See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 Int'l Lawyer 1167, 1174 (1998) . 60 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J. L. & COM. 509, 516 (1996) ("It is often said that small close-knit groups have a much better chance than large disparate ones of governing a commons with cultural norms instead of state commands. This would imply that early cyberspace could govern itself as a commons but that later cyberspace probably cannot.") (footnote omitted). 231, 284-86 (1996) . subgroup is so easy. 63 Or one might create special-purpose communities that share only a single norm. This may work: many Catholics with virtually nothing else in common nonetheless adhere to some of the norms of the Church. But unless the group has the history and cohesion --and hierarchical control --of the Catholic Church, it is a long way from a special-purpose community to effective self-governance.
The dynamic nature of the Internet "community" presents grave difficulties for courts that want to defer to Internet norms. To what norms shall they defer? The old "rule" that unsolicited commercial solicitations are disallowed? Or the newer rule that seems to permit or at least put up with them? I rather like the old rule myself, but then I was on the Net fifteen years (and countless Net generations) ago. 64 Should courts defer to the norm that information wants to be free, and limit the enforcement of intellectual property on the Net? And what shall be done about practices that have developed only recently: framing a competitor's site, 65 for example, or using a competitor's trademark in a metatag? 66 In these cases, there is probably no recognized norm because the practice is so new. It is not at all clear that we will find better answers to these questions by trying to determine the "culture" of the Net than by making informed public policy decisions.
67
63 Strictly speaking, exit is technically extremely easy from such a group. Nonetheless, the longer one participates in a group, the more irreversible commitments she may make, and the harder it may be to leave. These commitments may be social, or they may be economic (such as widespread distribution of an email address that the user will have to give up v. Welles, 7 F. Supp.2d 1098 (1998 . 67 Eric Posner notes a related problem --the fact that norms enforced by "village gossips" are slow to change means that a norm that is economically efficient at one point in time may persist even after circumstances have changed. Posner, supra note 12, at 1711-13.
DRAFT

16
I don't want to make too much of this argument. Norms can indeed survive under changing conditions, and the law must also deal with changing conditions. 68 But in the context of the Internet, where change is constant and drastic, the fact that a strong set of norms never got a real chance to develop leaves law with a significant advantage. The law can draw on a long history, both as a system and in the case of particular doctrines, to give it legitimacy in the face of new challenges. Internet norms have no similar history, and they may lack sufficient legitimacy to be effective in a changing environment.
69
B. Internet Norms Won't be Understood or Followed
Norms assume homogeneity --or at least symmetry --of interest within the group. 70 A group with a cohesive set of interests can punish individual members who act contrary to those interests and still claim some legitimacy. 71 Without that consensus of interest, though, there is nothing to distinguish "norms" imposed by a social group from the rough "justice" of the vigilante (assuming the group has the means to enforce the "norms"). If we brought them all together in a room, virtual or real, it is doubtful they would reach even a rough consensus on virtually any subject. Norms that purport to emanate from the Net as a whole are necessarily suspect, and we should rightly ask who is behind them. 82 True, in an exceptional case a particular norm might be widely shared among a variety of Net communities, but the case is so exceptional that it's hard to think of a single Internet norm that is uncontested.
A related problem is that these hypothetical Netizens never have gotten together in a room --even conceptually --to sort out what they believe and what rules they will enforce. Indeed, most people who spend even a fair amount of time on the Net encounter only a small group of other people.
83
Social norms need not develop through deliberative democracy, but they do need to be internalized somehow by the community that will enforce them. This is true for norms much more than for law, because norms derive whatever legitimacy they possess from group endorsement. There is simply no evidence that the majority of Netizens have ever given much thought to the appropriate social sanction for off-topic postings, much less whether cancelbots are the best informal Further, it may be much harder to for a community of 100 to effectively enforce its own norms, particularly against intrusion by outsiders. And without some means of effective enforcement, norms won't work at all to regulate behavior in most circumstances. To give just one example, Web sites have developed a cooperative norm governing access by Web "spiders" --bots that crawl around the Web searching for and cataloging particular types of content. The norm involves setting your spider to respect the wishes of the site you access, as identified in the site's "robots.txt" file. 90 The problem is that what Michael Sims calls "bad" spiders --spiders that want to access your site for 87 See Burk, supra note 55, at __. 88 Internet communities in which people invest significant reputational capital, and which remain fairly static over time, are the most likely centers for norm creation. 89 To be sure, this last problem is far from intractable. FAQs, flaming, and other newbie sanctions may serve the goal of communicating norms to newcomers at the same time they reinforce the norms of the community. But if a court is to enforce the norm, it must have some criterion for deciding when the norm is in fact known by the party to be charged. And if courts are to defer entirely to private enforcement, we may have to forego notions of due process that are fairly central to our legal system. 90 See "A Standard for Robot Exclusion," http://info.webcrawler.com/mak/projects/robots/norobots.html (last visited Aug. 27, 1998).
DRAFT 20 reasons you find objectionable --have no incentive to respect this norm. 91 The norm isn't technologically enforceable given the current structure of HTTP, and it probably isn't legally enforceable. It is "enforced" only to the extent people respect it, and the problem is that the only ones who respect it are the ones who aren't causing problems anyway.
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The problem of heterogeneity may be structurally embedded. In the software market, the trade press makes it relatively easy for consumers to get information about manufacturers' reputations for repairing their products and granting licenses. As a consequence, both manufacturers and consumers may prefer lower-priced software with broad disclaimers and the manufacturer's extralegal, reputation-bondbacked promise to grant licenses and repair products in appropriate circumstances…. Id. at 1791.
As an initial matter, even if some businesses have such a de facto agreement, it stretches credulity to think that most consumers have entered into any such bargain. Indeed, many of them may not be aware of the shrinkwrap license at all --and certainly not of its more arcane terms. See Hill , 105 F.3d at 1150 (enforcing a mandatory arbitration clause contained in a piece of paper placed inside a computer box, where the clause was not even part of a shrinkwrap license and the consumer took no affirmative act to agree to the term). Second, to the extent people are aware of onerous license terms, it seems more likely that the terms will have an in terrorem effect on legally unsophisticated parties --convincing people that they have no right to return or repair --than that they will serve as the basis for a mutuallyunderstood but unenforceable agreement that is directly contrary to the terms of the shrinkwrap license.
Importantly, Bernstein does not use her example as an argument for enforcing shrinkwrap licenses. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 12, at 1790-91. One could just as easily imagine a norm such as Bernstein describes in a world in which shrinkwrap licenses were not enforceable. Indeed, that is the world that existed when she wrote her article. See Lemley, supra note 85. 102 Glynn Lunney suggests that the appropriate way to evaluate customary trade practices is to look at the customs of both sides, and to reject a claimed trade practice which is in fact the practice of only one side, not the other. See Glynn Lunney, Protecting Digital Works: Copyright or Contract [draft at 14] (working paper 1998). DRAFT 23 do not become a part of the contract, or on the other hand by saying that parties will be bound to the terms by their subsequent conduct even though they could not have read them when first agreeing. The law can impose rules on unwilling and even unknowing parties. It is more problematic for informal norms to do so.
The Internet might be thought to alleviate this problem to some extent. After all, in some sense we are all publishers now, so perhaps we have some commonality of interest. But I suspect that cognitive dissonance remains alive and well on the Net. REV. 651, 692-93 (1998) (seeming to accept the premise that companies ought to be entitled to prevent unauthorized links to their sites). These companies obviously don't subscribe to the norm identified above, at least not when it comes to incoming links to their own sites. See Madison, supra note 33, at [draft at 22] (noting this divergence in assumptions about the norms regarding linking).
One can easily imagine circumstances in which a frame or link causes real or perceived injury to the linked party --many people might not appreciate a disparaging link from www.suck.com, for example, and Disney almost certainly doesn't want porn sites referring underage visitors to the Disney Web site. It does not follow from the fact of injury that one should have a cause of action to preclude the Heterogeneity of interest thus creates problems for norms, and for courts that would enforce or defer to those norms. These problems are not limited to the identification and legitimation of the norms. Another danger is that the norms selected may be inefficient. There is no reason to think this change is efficient, or that courts should defer to it.
But, copyright law currently seems enamored of the private ordering idea, and on some notable occasions it has deferred to a "norm" that was in fact merely a practice copyright owners hoped to establish.
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More generally, whatever "norms" might arise from a heterogenous community of this sort are properly suspect.
C. Norms Do Not Adequately Account for Externalities
The legal enforcement of norms creates externalities. The heterogeneity problem described above might be solved by dividing the Net into small, homogenous sub-communities and attempting to enforce the norms of those communities.
But doing this only exacerbates the externality problem. If one person's actions on the
Net have the potential to injure those off the Net, they surely have even greater potential to harm those outside the particular listservs one inhabits. Further, fragmenting the Net for the purposes of identifying norms is likely to produce at least some communities whose norms really do involving imposing costs on others. Imagine a sub-community that believes in free copying, for example, and how they would view Microsoft's claim to own the copyright in Windows 98. To let this group freely copy the program would be to give legal sanction to a private agreement to impose costs on others. To do otherwise would be to say that the welfare of the broader society must trump the norms of this particular community --which is exactly the argument for applying public law. I suspect that courts would (and should) choose the latter course without any hesitation.
One might mediate this tension by declaring a mandatory "meta-norm" that groups 
D. Network Effects and Standardization Make Exclusionary Norms Undesirable
There is a more structural problem with patching. The Internet is a prime example of a strong actual network. 123 The principal value of the Internet is mostly a function of the number of people who are connected to the network, and therefore the number of increases from zero as more and more people are added to the telephone network, so the value of being on the Internet increases as more people get on the Net. The implication of network effects in both markets is the same: the optimal number of both Internets and telephone networks is one. The existence of strong network effects in this market has a number of implications for Internet norms.
One implication of strong network effects is that Internet enclaves are bad --at least if those enclaves are not interconnected. Society will not benefit from a number of separate, incompatible Internets. The history of the Net reflects this. In the early 1990s, being online meant belonging to one or more of 50,000 different bulletin board systems (BBS's), or one of several large "online service providers" (OSPs) like Compuserve or America Online. This model failed, largely because the BBS's and OSPs were exclusive enclaves. Those, like America Online, that thrived in the 1990s did so because they became Internet service providers --because they joined the "winning" network in the standards competition.
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This doesn't mean there is no room on the Net for private groups, but it does mean that there is value to everyone in a general regime of open access.
A related problem is that the most likely informal sanction for severe misconduct --expulsion from the group, or, as Dunne suggests, from the Net itself 125 --is likely to be socially counterproductive. Exclusion in a strong network market not only hurts the party 124 While some continue to provide their own private content as well, they appear to have subscribers primarily because they provide access to the Internet. 125 See Dunne, supra note 5, at __. To be sure, expulsion is not a unitary remedy. A variety of punishments based around expulsion might be possible, ranging from warnings through the killing of DRAFT 31 being excluded; it hurts everyone else as well. This is especially true because the difficulty of reliably establishing individual identity on the Internet has caused the enforcers of exclusionary rules to cut off not just particular individuals but entire institutions from the Net. Refusing to accept data from a major ISP, or even a minor university or corporation, has much greater consequences than simply banning one individual. Of more concern, exclusion from the Internet may be an effective threat precisely because it involves imposing a significant cost on others. Vigilantes may therefore use the threat of exclusion to coerce people into doing things they otherwise wouldn't. One might look at this conduct and say "Of course --this is just norms at work." But it clearly creates significant opportunities for strategic behavior by those who control the means for exclusion. How desirable this result is depends in large part on who does the enforcing, an issue I discuss in the next section.
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A second implication of strong network effects for Internet norms is that constructing decentralized governance systems based on a patching model may have negative social consequences. If the optimal number of Internets is indeed one, governance of the system itself must in the final analysis be effective at a global level. This can be accomplished by a single body, by an international treaty, by national cooperation or cooption, or perhaps even by informal agreement. But the more governance structures have jurisdiction over the Internet, the higher the coordination costs will be, and the more particular messages to the elimination of a user from the Net or even the elimination of an entire IP domain from the Net. 126 [delete this footnote] 127 See infra section E.
likely it is that the different governing parties will fail to reach agreement on a crucial issue.
128
A third implication is that we ought to be concerned not only Finally, norms are built in part around existing technological structures and constraints. In a network market, at least some of those structures are likely to prove quite durable. We could create a new phone system --or a new Internet --that differs from the current one, but we probably won't, and for good reason. The social value of the Internet is a function of the number of people already on it; change the structure, and you risk losing the network benefits.
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Norms that arise based on existing technological constraints may therefore persist even if they become inefficient. This problem of norm "lock-in" should give courts further pause in assuming that deference to Internet norms is efficient. Two such technologies are worth further discussion. The first is the cancelbot, a "bot" (or automated software daemon) that will cancel a particular message posted to a Usenet newsgroup. The cancelbot works by pretending to be a message sent by the originator of the posting to be cancelled asking that the message be withdrawn. Usenet allows such cancellation by the author of the original message; the cancelbot deceives the system in order to cancel someone else's message.
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A more dramatic form of automated exclusion is the "Usenet death penalty" (UDP). Imposing the UDP on a service provider will block all Usenet messages from a particular source. The UDP does not work in automated fashion, but rather requires the compliance of the individual system administrators who host Usenet relays, and who comply with the UDP by agreeing not to relay messages from the targeted source.
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UDPs were announced in 1997 and 1998 against two large Internet access providers:
UUNet Technologies and Netcom. In both cases, the UDP was called because of the ISP's alleged indifference to Usenet spam being sent through its system. Lisa Bernstein identifies another problem with judicial enforcement of norms. If, as her investigations suggest, many perceived "norms" in fact assume that there will be no judicial enforcement of the trade practice, the very act of enforcing the norm may frustrate its purpose.
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More generally, to the extent that norms are formed against the background of legal rules, modifying legal rules to accommodate those norms may be selfdefeating.
Embedding Enforcement in the Structure of the Internet
Code can also serve to enforce social norms. Rules of behavior can be designed into the architecture of the Net itself, or written into software that is used in particular 147 Stephen which allows for voluntary self-rating but allows access to unrated sites; "opt-out" software, which allows access only to self-rated sites; and a large number of commercial rating programs, which rate third party content for you in ways that may range from having a person read each site to having automated filters search for "dirty words." Second, the code in filtering software takes on a life of its own, even for those who choose to use it. Installing filtering software effectively delegates control over your access to information to a computer program. The computer program won't always tell you what it won't let you see, and may not tell you why a particular site is restricted. And because filtering software is decidedly imperfect, even software that tries to filter out only what you really don't want may be both over-and underinclusive. Finally, and most important, the fact that a filter is imposed "privately" does not mean that it is imposed by the person whose access to material is restricted. Indeed, the major use of Internet content filters is not by individuals who wish to restrict their own access to certain sites, but by parents making decisions for their children, or corporations, universities, schools, or libraries making decisions for their employees, students, or patrons. In these cases, social choices are at the very least limited and directed by the architecture of the technology we design and implement.
Finally, the architecture of code may conflict with the rules established by the legal system. This sort of conflict is most common when the law demands flexibility that the code does not allow. 160 One example involves domain name trademark disputes, where trademark law rules permitting two owners of a mark to coexist in different product or geographic space run into the constraints of a system that permits only one user of a name in each top-level domain. 161 We could change the law to give trademark owners absolute 44 In short, there are three possible types of actors who might enforce Internet norms:
self-appointed private individuals who determine the norms and enforce them, usually by excluding offenders from the Net altogether; judges deferring to norms in the particular cases in which the issues arise; or the architecture of the Internet itself, which might simply make certain types of conduct impossible. None of these choices is particularly palatable.
Probably the best choice is to rely on judges. Even there, it is worth noting that by asking judges to identify and interpret Internet norms rather than legal rules, we have placed them at an inherent disadvantage.
III. Conclusions
Though they take place in the context of the Internet, these debates are not new.
More than 150 years ago, Justice Story warned against deference to informal norms at the expense of public law:
I own myself no friend to the almost indiscriminate habit of late years, of setting up particular usages or customs in almost all kinds of business and trade, to control, vary, or annul the general liabilities of parties under the common law . . . . [T] here is no small danger in admitting such loose and inconclusive usages and customs, often unknown to particular parties, and always liable to great misunderstandings and misinterpretations and abuses, to outweigh the well-known and well-settled principles of law.
168
Internet scholars would do well to consider Justice Story's words.
Modern legal scholarship about norms has much to recommend it. It represents an admirable trend in law and economics towards developing a richer understanding of the context in which legal and business rules operate. Understanding these norms will help the law develop in an efficient way. It may even be the case that the law ought to defer to established norms in certain circumstances. At the same time, however, courts and policyInternet Norms DRAFT 45 makers ought to approach Internet norms with some caution. It is not at all clear that the exuberance shown by some scholars over the self-governance potential of the Net is warranted. At the very least, courts and legislatures (to say nothing of scholars) should think long and hard about how they will identify the norms of the Net, how widely those norms are understood and shared, and how durable they are likely to be. They should also give serious consideration to the policies reflected in existing legal doctrines, and how those policies will fare in a world governed (directly or indirectly) by norms. This is not to say that norms will play no role in shaping the governance structures of the Net. As Larry Lessig has repeatedly explained, law and norms do not exist in a vacuum. Not only do they interact with each other, they both interact with the architecture of the space in which they reside. 169 Law, norms and "code" will continue to coexist, because while the law might influence both norms and code, it cannot and should not eliminate them entirely. 170 Their interaction is complex, and yet to be fully explored.
But, the private ordering model to which I react in this article would effectively take public law out of the equation, leaving governance to a combination of norms and code. I think this is a bad idea.
In 1995, essentially before there were any cases in the field, Lessig extolled the virtues of the slow, adaptive common law development process for the Net. 171 We now have hundreds of reported decisions in various aspects of "Internet law" ranging from jurisdiction to trademark law to the First Amendment. As I look at these cases, it seems before we proclaim the law to be a failure, we ought to give it a chance to work. And certainly before we abdicate responsibility for governance to informal social groups or to programmers, we ought to have a much better sense than we do of whether the world that would result is one we would want to live in.
